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IntroductIon
In	an	article	from	2000,	an	investigative	journalist	from	The Banker	
warned	 against	 the	 hidden	 dangers	 of	 credit	 default	 swaps	 (CDS).1	
Although	CDSs	can	be	a	useful	financial	 instrument	 for	 the	banking	
industry,	2	 the	article	warned	of	 the	anonymity	of	credit	derivatives,3	
*	 J.D.,	American	 University	 Washington	 College	 of	 Law,	 2010;	 B.A.	 in	 Economics,	 College	 of	
William	and	Mary.		I	would	like	to	thank	Professor	Anderson	for	all	his	help	in	developing	my	
topic.		
1	 See generally	Jules	Stewart,	Hidden Dangers of Credit Swaps, Banker,	Dec.	2000,	at	74	(outlining	
the	dangers	of	the	reliance	on	CDSs).
2	 See	René	M.	Stulz,	In Defense of Derivatives and How to Regulate Them,	Wall St.	J.,	April	7,	2009,	
at	A15	(explaining	that	derivatives	allow	businesses	to	hedge	risk	and	credit	derivatives	allow	
lenders	to	offer	credit	on	better	terms,	thus	promoting	business	growth).	
3	 See	Stewart,	supra	note	1,	at	74	(“Then	there	is	the	issue	of	the	anonymity	of	credit	derivatives,	
such	that	corporations	have	no	idea	who	is	exposed	to	them	and	only	find	out	when	something	
goes	wrong.”).
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lack	of	transparency,4	and	the	potential	for	disaster.5	In	an	unfortunately	
accurate	 conclusion,	 the	 journalist	 opined	 that	 a	 crisis	 might	 occur	
because	 banks	 may	 not	 put	 in	 place	 the	 proper	 risk	 control	 systems	
in	time	to	avert	a	disaster.6	Fast	forward	eight	years	and	the	financial	
meltdown	of	2008	developed	into	one	of	the	largest	economic	disasters	
in	history.7	Banks	and	other	large	market	actors	had	taken	risk	and,	in	
many	cases,	reckless	financial	positions	that	put	them	at	the	brink	of	
bankruptcy.8	The	ensuing	bailout	targeted	some	of	the	largest	financial	
entities,	but	the	damage	to	the	financial	markets	had	already	occurred.9	
While	many	individuals	debate	about	what	factors	caused	the	financial	
meltdown,	regulators	and	Congress	pointed	to	CDSs	as	a	contributing	
factor	to	the	financial	meltdown.10	At	one	point,	American	International	
Group,	Inc.	(AIG),	owed	in	excess	of	$400	billion	to	counterparties	in	
CDS	contracts	and	this	was	money	that	AIG	simply	did	not	have.11
CDSs,	as	financial	 instruments,	are	both	beneficial	and	detrimen-
tal.12	CDSs	do	not	necessarily	create	instability,	but	the	contracts	can	be	
conduits	of	instability	by	shifting	the	risk	of	default	onto	another	entity.	
This	 receiving	 entity,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 can	 be	 ill-equipped	 to	 deal	
with	this	new	risk,	even	though	it	views	itself	as	capable.13	Regardless	
4	 Id.	at	76	(stating	that	even	though	no	one	knows	who	holds	credit	risk	to	a	particular	name	at	
any	point,	the	bankers	who	deal	with	credit	derivatives	prefer	the	instruments	because	it	enables	
banks	 to	manage	 their	credit	 risk	discreetly	without	affecting	customer	relations.	“This	 lack	of	
transparency	.	.	.	could	open	the	door	to	a	chaotic	situation.”).	
5	 Id.	at	74	(“One	analyst	who	follows	the	sector	says:	‘If	banks	fail	to	get	to	grips	with	the	opera-
tional	risks	of	credit	derivatives	they	could	find	that	they	create	more	problems	than	they	solve	
–	in	which	case,	credit	derivatives	could	end	up	triggering	a	banking	crisis	rather	than	averting	
one.’”).
6	 Id.	at	77	(“[T]he	fear	is	that	it	will	take	a	crisis	before	banks	put	proper	risk	control	systems	in	
place.”).
7	 Richard A. Posner,	A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of ‘08 and the Descent into 
Depression	vii	(2009)	(“A	vocabulary	rich	only	in	euphemisms	calls	what	has	happened	to	the	
economy	a	‘recession.’	We	are	well	beyond	that.	We	are	in	the	midst	of	the	biggest	economic	crisis	
since	the	Great	Depression	of	the	1930s.”).
8	 Jerome	A.	Madden,	A Weapon of Mass Destruction Strikes: Credit Default Swaps Bring Down AIG 
and Lehman Brothers,	8	Am. U. Bus. L. Brief	15,	15	(2008)	(chronicling	the	financial	crisis	through	
AIG	and	actions	from	regulators).	
9	 AIG and The Trouble With Credit Default Swaps’, NPR (Sept.	18,	2008),	http://www.npr.org/tem-
plates/story/story.php?storyId=94748529&ps=rs	(explaining	that	the	large	size	of	the	CDS	busi-
ness	was	enough	to	make	the	failure	of	AIG	a	global	economic	threat	and	there	was	a	fear	that	
AIG’s	insurance	banks	across	the	world	would	be	at	risk).	
10	 Id.	
11	 Alex	Blumberg,	Unregulated Credit Default Swaps Led to Weakness,	NPR	(Oct.	31,	2008),	http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId	=96395271.
12	 René	 M.	 Stulz,	 Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis	 7	 (European	 Corporate	 Governance	
Inst.,	 Working	 Paper	 No.	 264,	 2009)	 available at http://www.ecgi.org/wp/wp_id.php?id=400	
(“Credit	default	swaps	have	both	social	benefits	and	social	costs.	The	social	benefits	are	that	they	
make	it	easier	for	credit	risk	to	be	borne	by	those	who	are	in	the	best	position	to	bear	them	that	
they	enable	finance	institutions	to	make	loans	they	would	not	otherwise	be	able	to	make,	and	that	
their	trading	reveals	useful	information	about	credit	risk.”).
13	 See e.g.,	Anupan	Chander	&	Randall	Costa,	Clearing Credit Default Swaps: A Case Study in Global 
Legal Convergence,	10	Chi. J. Int’l L.	639,	649–50	(“AIG	and	Lehman,	both	highly	regulated,	capi-
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of	 the	 benefits	 of	 CDS	 transactions,	 the	 public	 viewed	 the	 financial	
derivative	as	dangerous.
Due	to	the	public’s	anger,	there	was	substantial	impetuousness	in	
Congress	to	create	new	legislation	to	prevent	another	market	wide	fail-
ure.	 Both	 the	 U.S.	 House	 of	 Representatives14	 and	 U.S.	 Senate15	 pro-
posed	their	own	pieces	of	 legislation,	and,	 in	June	of	2010,	President	
Barack	Obama	signed	the	financial	reform	bill.	Part	I	of	this	paper	will	
discuss	CDSs	and	the	swap	market.	Part	II	will	review	the	prior	law,	
which	governed	CDSs,	and	the	changes	being	made	to	this	law	by	the	
financial	reform	bill.	Part	III	will	discuss,	in	a	qualitative	manner,	how	
these	changes	will	affect	CDS	contracts	and	the	market	for	these	con-
tracts	and	whether	clearing	CDSs	will	adequately	address	 the	 issues	
within	the	financial	markets.	Part	IV	will	discuss	the	governance	issues	
that	still	underlie	the	CDS	markets	and	the	impact	of	the	new	legisla-
tion	on	governance	and	trading.
Part I
a. What are CredIt default SWaPS?
CDSs	 are	 financial	 instruments	 that	 create	 an	 exchange	 of	 pay-
ments	based	on	 the	credit	performance	of	an	underlying	asset.16	The	
company	 buying	 the	 CDS	 protection	 is	 hedging	 against	 some	 credit	
exposure	it	has	to	the	underlying	asset	and	the	seller	of	the	CDS	is	will-
ing	to	take	on	that	risk	to	get	a	stream	of	payments	from	the	CDS	buy-
er.17	If	the	underlying	asset	falters	(and	the	exact	definition	of	“falter”	is	
specified	in	the	contract	between	the	two	parties),	then	the	CDS	seller	
must	make	a	payment.	That	payment	may	be	in	the	form	of	making	the	
CDS	buyer	whole	on	the	investment,	in	the	underlying	asset,	or	may	
be	a	contractually	predetermined	amount	of	money	or	securities.18	 If	
the	underlying	asset	never	falters,	the	CDS	buyer	continues	to	pay	the	
tal-supervised	entities,	proved	insufficiently	capitalized	to	avoid	default.	.	.	.	AIG’s	counterparties	
allowed	AIG	an	exemption	from	both	initial	margin	and	variation	margin	payments.”).	
14	 H.R.	4173,	111th	Cong.	(2010).	
15	 S.	3217,	111th	Cong.	(2010).	
16	 Frank	Partnoy	&	David	A.	Skeel,	Jr.,	The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives,	75	U. Cin. L. Rev. 
1019,	1021	(2007).
17	 See	id.	(“We	define	credit	derivatives	as	financial	instruments	whose	payoffs	are	linked	in	some	
way	to	a	change	in	credit	quality	of	an	issuer	or	issuers.”).
18	 Viral	 V.	 Acharya,	 Robert	 F.	 Engle,	 Stephen	 Figlewski,	 Anthony	 W.	 Lynch	 &	 Marti	 G.	
Subrahmanyam, Centralized Clearing for Credit Derivatives,	 in Restoring Financial Stability: 
How to Repair a Failed System	251,	254	(Viral	V.	Acharya	&	Matthew	Richardson	eds.,	2009)	
[hereinafter	Restoring	Financial	Stability]	(“[T]he	protection	seller	is	exposed	to	the	risk	that	the	
reference	entity	(the	firm	or	sovereign	borrower	the	CDS	is	written	on)	will	default.	If	that	hap-
pens,	the	seller	is	immediately	liable	for	the	default	loss	on	the	obligor’s	debt,	which	can	be	as	
much	as	the	entire	principal	amount	of	the	CDS.”).	
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stream	of	payments	necessary	to	keep	the	contract	 in	 force,	until	 the	
contract	expires.
The	best	example	of	the	incentives	behind	CDSs	is	a	bank	lending	
to	a	 large	 corporation.19	Although	 the	bank	 is	well	 aware	of	 the	 risk	
they	have	taken	and	have	considered	the	risk	in	their	interest	rate,	the	
corporation	may	want	more	money	and	the	bank	may	not	be	willing	
to	 make	 those	 additional	 loans.20	 The	 bank	 can	 make	 the	 additional	
loans	and	also	hedge	the	risk	that	 the	corporation	will	default	on	 its	
debt.21	Thus,	the	bank	makes	the	loan	and	then	creates	a	CDS	contract	
with	another	financial	entity.22	The	financial	entity	receives	a	stream	of	
payments,	while	the	bank	has	the	protection	of	knowing	that	if	the	cor-
poration	defaults	on	the	debt,	the	financial	entity	will	make	a	payment	
to	the	bank.23
From	this	simple	example,	it	is	clear	that	CDSs	have	the	potential	
to	be	beneficial	financial	instruments.	By	transferring	the	risk	from	the	
CDS	buyer	to	the	CDS	seller,	there	is,	supposedly,	a	more	efficient	out-
come	 because	 the	 party	 who	 is	 interested	 in	 carrying	 the	 risk	 of	 the	
investment	is	the	party	that	receives	the	risk.24	In	an	ideal	situation,	col-
lateral	on	the	contract	will	reflect	the	inherent	risks,	such	as	one	party	
may	not	perform	on	the	contract.	Thus,	if	a	financial	organization	owns	
bonds	in	a	company	and	is	worried	that	the	company	will	default,	the	
financial	organization	can	manage	that	risk	by	using	CDSs.25	By	having	
the	risk	hedged,	the	financial	organization	can	lend	to	others	and	invest	
in	other	ventures.26	There	is	also	the	potential,	however,	that	CDSs	may	
be	abused	or	simply	misused.	The	contracts	appear	as	simple	transac-
tions,	but	problems	may	arise	quickly.	What	if	the	financial	entity	can-
not	make	the	final	payment?	Or	what	if	the	financial	entity	has	entered	
into	so	many	CDS	contracts	 that	 there	 is	no	way	 it	 can	make	all	 the	
payments?27
19	 See, e.g.,	Partnoy	&	Skeel,	supra	note	16,	at	1023	(using	General	Motors	as	an	example	of	the	
incentives	driving	banks	to	make	loans	to	large	corporations).	
20	 See	AIG and The Trouble With ‘Credit Default Swaps,’ NPR (Sept.	18,	2008),	http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=94748529&ps=rs.	
21	 See	Partnoy	&	Skeel,	supra	note	16,	at	1023	(“If	the	bank	would	rather	oversee	the	loan	itself	(or	
minimize	the	size	of	its	syndicate),	credit	default	swaps	provide	an	alternative	method	for	laying	
off	some	of	the	risk.	By	purchasing	credit	default	swaps,	the	bank	can	handle	the	loan	and	lending	
relationship	itself,	and	reduce	the	potential	downside	costs	of	a	default	by	the	borrower.”).	
22	 See id.	
23	 See	 Sherri	 Venokur,	 Matthew	 Magidson	 &	Adam	 M.	 Singer,	 Comparing Credit Default Swaps 
or Insurance Contracts: Did the New York State Insurance Department Get it Right?,	 28	Futures & 
Derivatives L. Rep.	1,	3	(2008).
24	 See Partnoy	&	Skeel, supra	note	16,	at	1022–24.	
25	 Rene	M.	Stulz,	In Defense of Derivatives and How to Regulate Them,	Wall St. J.,	Apr.	7,	2009,	at	
A15.	
26	 Id.	
27	 See generally	Chander	&	Costa,	supra	note	13,	at	649–50	(“[I]n	the	case	of	AIG,	it	became	appar-
ent	that	the	bilateral,	private,	and	unregulated	character	of	the	market	had	allowed	AIG’s	dealer	
counterparties	to	relax	their	margin	rules,	relying	in	part	on	AIG’s	overall	high	credit	ratings	and	
perceived	balance	sheet	strength.”).
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B. Who Are the MArket PArticiPAnts?
CDSs	are	considered	“over	the	counter	derivatives”	because	they	
are	not	cleared	by	a	clearinghouse	or	placed	on	an	exchange.28	Market	
participants	execute	CDS	agreements	bilaterally.29	The	market	partici-
pants	include	dealers,	end-users,	and	speculators.30
Similar	 to	 clearinghouses,	dealers	act	as	 the	 intermediary	 for	 the	
many	 end-users	 that	 contract	 with	 the	 dealer	 and	 then	 hedge	 their	
exposure	 to	 each	 contract	 by	 offsetting	 the	 trade.31	 However,	 these	
dealers	do	not	impose	any	of	the	rules	that	established	clearinghouses	
enforce.32	Prior	 to	 the	economic	meltdown,	 the	 largest	dealers	 in	 the	
United	 States	 were	 Wachovia	 &	 Company,	 Citibank,	 and	 JPMorgan	
Chase	&	Co.,	and	the	largest	foreign	dealers	included	Deutsche	Bank	
Group,	UBS	AG,	and	ABN	AMRO	Bank	N.V.33	Investment	banks,	such	
as	Morgan	Stanley	Companies,	Inc.;	Bear	Stearns;	Goldman	Sachs;	and	
insurance	companies,	such	as	AIG	and	Swiss	Re,	were	also	active	in	the	
market.34
End-users	 can	 include	 large	and	 small	 corporations	or	any	other	
organization	 and	 individual	 looking	 to	 hedge	 a	 particular	 transac-
tion	or	to	hedge	business	risks,	such	as	the	volatility	of	interest	rates	
and	commodity	prices.35	End-users	tend	to	have	a	specific	purpose	for	
being	in	the	market	or	they	have	an	interest	 in	the	underlying	trans-
action	they	are	hedging.36	On	the	other	hand,	speculators	are	a	larger	
group	of	individuals	who	use	the	market	to	make	a	profit	from	market	
28	 Michael	Kent,	OTC Derivative Regulation – the Benefits of Clearing,	30	Futures & Derivatives L. 
Rep.	13,	14	(2010)	(“OTC	markets	have	traditionally	not	involved	clearing,	as	the	products	have	
included	non-standardized	contracts	which	could	not	be	traded	on	exchange.”).
29	 See Partnoy	&	Skeel,	supra	note	16,	at	1021	(“[A]	credit	default	swap	is	a	private	contract	 in	
which	private	parties	bet	on	a	debt	issuer’s	bankruptcy,	default,	or	restructuring.”).	
30	 Christian A. Johnson,	 The Guide to Using and Negotiating OTC Derivatives 
Documentation	4	(2005)	[hereinafter	OCI Derivatives Documentation]	(“The	OTC	derivative	
industry	is	composed	primarily	of	three	different	categories	of	participants:	dealers,	end-users,	
and	speculators.”).	
31	 See id.	(“The	dealer	takes	one	side	of	a	trade	with	one	end-user	and	then	enters	into	an	offsetting	
trade	with	another	end-user.”).
32	 See generally	Christian	Johnson,	The Enigma of Clearing: Buy Side OTC Derivatives,	29	Futures 
& Derivatives L. Rep.	 1,	 7	 (Dec.	 2009)	 [hereinafter	 Enigma of Clearing]	 (explaining	 that	 due	 to	
the	new	regulations	 requiring	OTC	derivatives	 to	be	cleared,	 clearinghouses	will	have	 to	“de-
velop	backoffices	and	processes	 that	banks	and	other	dealers	have	spent	years	cultivating	and	
refining.”).	
33	 OTC Derivatives Documentation,	supra	note	29,	at	4–5	(“The	largest	dealers	in	the	OTC	mar-
ket	 in	 the	 United	 States	 [were]	 the	 large	 money	 center	 and	 regional	 banks	 such	 as	 Wachovia,	
Citibank,	and	JPMorgan	Chase.	.	.	.	Foreign	bank[s]	[were]	also	major	participants.	.	.	.	[including]	
Deutsche	Bank,	UBS	AG,	and	ABN	AMRO.”).
34	 Id.	at	5	(“Large	investment	banks	such	as	Morgan	Stanley,	Bear	Stearns,	and	Goldman	Sachs	are	
also	prominent	in	derivatives.”).	
35	 See generally	Enigma of Clearing,	supra	note	32,	at	4	(explaining	that	“the	buy	side	.	.	.	demand[s]	
customized	derivative	products	from	dealers	to	meet	hedging	requirements	and	other	needs	that	
were	not	available	through	exchanges	and	clearinghouses”).
36	 Id.	
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movements.37	 Speculators	 can	 include	 hedge	 funds,	 financial	 institu-
tions,	dealers,	or	end-users.38
C. What are CDS ContraCtS?
The	 International	 Swaps	 and	 Derivatives	Association	 (ISDA)	 has	
standardized	documentation	for	many	swap	agreements.39	A	CDS	agree-
ment	includes	a	Confirmation,	ISDA	Master	Agreement,	Schedule,	and	
Credit	Support	Documents.40	While	the	basic	documents	are	standard-
ized,	the	market	participants	still	have	control	over	many	parts	of	the	
transaction,	especially	 in	comparison	to	other	derivative	 instruments	
that	are	traded	over	regulated	exchanges	and	clearinghouses.41	Market	
participants	can	specify	the	trigger	event,	collateral,	and	the	stream	of	
payments	to	keep	the	contract	“alive.”	The	ability	to	customize	a	CDS	
contract	gives	market	participants	a	tremendous	amount	of	flexibility	
but	can	also	bring	about	liquidity	and	credit	risk.	A	customized	con-
tract	 allows	 market	 participants	 to	 minimize	 the	 basis	 or	 correlation	
risk,	which	is	the	risk	that	the	product	does	not	match	the	underlying	
risk	to	be	hedged.	The	benefit	of	a	clearinghouse	lies	in	the	economies	
of	scale,	 in	 that	 the	clearinghouses	provide	greater	 liquidity	by	stan-
dardizing	contracts.42
Part II
a. In WIth the neW, out WIth the olD; CDS tranSItIon from  
over-the-Counter DerIvatIveS to the ClearInghouSe
Swaps	were	exempt	from	regulation	because	of	amendments	made	
to	the	Commodity	Exchange	Act	(CEA)43	by	the	Commodity	Futures	
Modernization	Act	of	2000	(CFMA).44	Prior	to	the	CFMA	amendments,	
the	derivatives	market	participants	had	expressed	concern	over	whether	
37	 OTC Derivatives Documentation,	supra	note	30,	at	6–7.	
38	 Id.	(“[Speculators]	typically	includes	hedge	funds	and	other	similar	financial	institutions,	but	
may	also	include	dealers	or	end-users	attempting	to	profit	from	market	movements.”).
39	 Id.	at	7	(referring	to	the	ISDA	Master	Agreement,	which	is	used	in	“virtually	every	contractual	
relationship	governing	the	use	of	OTC	derivatives”).	
40	 Id.	at	14–15	(noting	that	the	ISDA	Master	Agreement	has	simplified,	formalized,	and	lowered	
costs	of	OTC	derivative	transactions).	
41	 See generally	Ward	Bortz	&	Jeffrey	A.	Rosenberg,	The Big Bang: A Guide to the Standardized CDS 
Contract,	29	Futures & Derivatives L. Rep.	10	(May	2009)	(discussing	the	various	contract	pro-
visions,	 which	 are	 amendments	 to	 the	 CDS	 contract,	 enacted	 through	 an	 ISDA	 protocol	 and	
supplement).
42	 Sharon	Brown-Hruska,	The Derivatives Marketplace: Exchanges and the Over-the-Counter Market, 
Financial Derivatives 23 (Robert	W.	Kolb	&	James	A.	Overdahl	eds.,	2010).	
43	 7	U.S.C.	§	1.	
44	 Commodity	Futures	Modernization	Act	of	2000,	Pub.	L.	No.	106-554,	§	303,	114	Stat.	2763	(2000).	
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CDS	contracts	were	exempt	from	registration,	and	the	CFMA	amend-
ments	clarified	and	provided	assurance	 that	CDS	contracts	were	not	
subject	to	regulation	by	the	Commodity	Futures	Trading	Commission	
(CFTC).45	The	CFMA	solidified	the	exemption	for	swaps	by	adding	7	
U.S.C.	§	2(d),	1(a)(13).46	Section	§	2(d)	of	the	CEA	states	that	the	CEA	
does	not	govern	a	transaction	in	an	excluded	commodity	if	the	transac-
tion	is	between	eligible	contract	participants	and	the	transaction	is	not	
executed	on	a	trading	facility.47	Excluded	commodities	 include	credit	
risk	commodities.48	Eligible	contract	participants
include	 a	 ‘financial	 institution’	 and	 any	 ‘corporation,	
partnership,	proprietorship,	organization,	trust,	or	other	
entity’	that	has:	(i)	total	assets	exceeding	$10,000,000	or	
a	net	worth	exceeding	$1,000,000	and	(ii)	‘enter[ed]	into	
an	 agreement,	 contract,	 or	 transaction	 in	 connection	
with	the	conduct	of	the	entity’s	business	or	to	manage	
the	 risk	associated	with	an	asset	or	 liability	owned	or	
incurred	or	reasonably	 likely	 to	be	owned	or	 incurred	
by	the	entity	in	the	conduct	of	the	entity’s	business.’49
Additionally,	even	though	the	underlying	asset	of	a	CDS	contract	could	
be	a	security,	group	of	securities,	or	index	of	securities,	CDSs	are	not	
regulated	as	a	security-based	swap.50
Furthermore,	 there	 is	 no	 requirement	 that	 CDSs	 be	 traded	 on	
exchanges	 or	 clearinghouses,	 and	 there	 are	 no	 regulations	 regarding	
how	much	collateral	should	be	posted	in	each	CDS	contract.	The	Dodd-
Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	and	Consumer	Protection	Act	(Dodd-Frank	
Act)51	 drastically	 changed	 the	 regulatory	 regime	 of	 CDSs,	 beginning	
with	bringing	the	financial	instruments	under	the	regulatory	purview	
of	both	the	CFTC	and	the	Securities	and	Exchange	Commission	(SEC).
45	 See	Enigma of Clearing, supra note	32,	at	4	(Dec.	2009)	[hereinafter	Enigma	of	Clearing]	(“In	an	
effort	to	enhance	legal	certainty	and	to	determine	regulatory	jurisdiction	over	the	nascent	OTC	
derivatives	market,	the	Commodity	Futures	Trading	Commission	issued	its	1989	policy	statement	
[stating	that]	the	CFTC	[will]	not	regulate	OTC	derivatives	that	were	not,	in	essence,	disguised	
futures.”).	
46	 Commodity	Futures	Modernization	Act	of	2000,	Pub.	L.	No.	106-554,	§§	101,	103,	114	Stat.	2763	
(2000).	
47	 7	U.S.C	§	2(d).
48	 7	U.S.C	§	1a(13)	(“The	term	‘excluded	commodity’	means	–	(i)	an	interest	rate,	exchange	rate,	
currency,	security,	security	index,	credit	risk	or	measure,	debt	or	equity	instrument,	index	or	mea-
sure	of	inflation,	or	other	macroeconomic	index	or	measure.”).
49	 OTC Derivatives Documentation,	supra	note	30,	at	95.	
50	 See	 Venokur,	 Magidson	 &	 Singer,	 supra	 note	 23,	 at	 6	 (“The	 CFMA	 effectively	 excludes	 CDS	
Transactions	from	the	registration	requirements	of	the	[securities	laws]	because	it	clarifies	that	a	
swap	based	on	a	security	is	not	a	security.”).	
51	 Dodd-Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	and	Consumer	Protection	Act,	Pub.	L.	No.	111-203,	124	Stat.	
1376.	
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B. Congressional DeBate surrounDing the DoDD-Frank aCt  
anD the Final result
First,	 the	new	legislation	changed	the	CEA	by	striking	the	provi-
sions	that	allowed	for	an	exemption	for	swaps.52	Additionally,	the	new	
legislation	amended	the	securities	 laws	so	 that	security-based	swaps	
are	 under	 the	 regulatory	 purview	 of	 the	 SEC.53	 Both	 the	 Senate	 and	
House	bills	imposed	registration	requirements	on	many	participants	in	
the	CDS	markets.54	Dealers	are	required	to	register	as	“swap	dealers”,	
which	is	defined	as	any	person	who,	as	a	significant	part	of	 its	busi-
ness,	(i)	holds	himself	or	herself	out	as	a	dealer,	(ii)	“makes	a	market	in	
swaps,”	(iii)	regularly	engages	in	the	purchase	or	sale	of	swaps	in	the	
ordinary	course	of	business,	or	(iv)	engages	in	any	activity	that	would	
cause	such	person	to	be	known	as	a	dealer.55
Likewise,	“major	swap	participants”	are	required	to	register,	and	
the	definition	includes	any	person	who	is	not	a	swap	dealer	and	“main-
tains	a	substantial	position	 in	outstanding	swaps	 in	any	major	swap	
category,”	excluding	hedging	and	mitigating	commercial	risk,	“whose	
outstanding	swaps	create	substantial	counterparty	exposure	that	could	
have	serious	adverse	effects	on	the	financial	stability,”	or	is	“highly	lev-
eraged	relative	to	the	amount	of	capital	it	holds.”56	The	House	intended	
to	 define	 “major	 swap	 participant”	 to	 encompass	 those	 entities	 that	
were	actively	engaged	in	the	swap	markets	but	to	allow	end-users	an	
exemption,	 so	 that	 end-users	 would	 not	 be	 subject	 to	 collateral	 and	
margin	requirements.	However,	this	issue	was	fought	on	two	occasions	
in	the	House,	in	first	passing	H.R.	4173	and	then	again	during	the	rec-
onciliation	 of	 the	 Senate	 and	 House	 versions	 of	 the	 financial	 reform	
bill.	57
Before	H.R.	4173	was	passed	in	the	House,	Representative	Murphy	
proposed	an	amendment	that	would	return	the	definition	of	major	swap	
participant	to	the	definition	that	came	out	of	the	Agriculture	Committee.	
While	the	two	definitions	seem	only	slightly	different,	the	difference	in	
wording	reflected	the	differing	perspectives	towards	end-users.58	The	
House	passed	Representative	Murphy’s	amendment	and	opted	for	a	
52	 S.	3217,	111th	Cong.	§	721	(2009).
53	 Id.	at	§	717.
54	 See infra	notes	59–65.
55	 Dodd-Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	and	Consumer	Protection	Act,	H.R.	4173,	111th	Cong.	§	721(49)	
(2010).
56	 Id.	at	§	721(33).
57	 See supra	notes	62-66.	
58	 Compare	id.	(“[W]hose	outstanding	swaps	create	substantial	net	counterparty	exposure	among	
the	 aggregate	 of	 its	 counterparties	 that	 could	 expose	 those	 counterparties	 to	 significant	 credit	
loss.”)	with	155	Cong. Rec. H14712	(daily	ed.	Dec.	10,	2010)	(amendment	offered	by	Rep.	Murphy)	
(“The	term	‘major	swap	participant’	means	any	person	who	is	not	a	swap	dealer,	and	.	.	.	(ii)	whose	
outstanding	swaps	create	substantial	net	counterparty	exposure	that	could	have	serious	adverse	
effects	on	the	financial	stability	of	the	US	banking	system	or	financial	markets.”)	.	
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more	expansive	exemption	for	end-users	by	labeling	an	end-user	as	a	
major	swap	participant	only	if	the	end-user’s	outstanding	swaps	posi-
tion	could	create	serious	adverse	effects	for	U.S.	financial	stability,	as	
opposed	 to	 a	 swaps	 position	 that	 could	 expose	 its	 counterparties	 to	
significant	credit	loss.59	Subsequent	amendments,	such	as	those	which	
would	allow	regulators	to	set	a	margin	in	swap	transaction	involving	
end-users	and	another	amendment	 that	would	maintain	 the	clearing	
exemption	 for	end-users	but	 require	end-users	 to	 report	 the	 transac-
tion	on	an	exchange,	were	also	voted	down	to	provide	end-users	with	
added	protection.60	While	in	both	cases,	the	amendments	were	geared	
towards	 creating	 additional	 stability	 and	 transparency;	 both	 amend-
ments	would	impose	additional	requirements	and	obligations	on	end-
users	that	a	majority	of	the	House	did	not	want	to	impose	on	end-users.	
However,	the	Conference	Committee,	tasked	with	reconciling	both	ver-
sions	of	H.R.	4173,	undid	much	of	this	work,	and	subsequent	debates	
over	the	changes	reflected	a	deep	concern	over	the	impact	of	H.R.	4173	
on	end-users.61
In	the	final	debate	over	H.R.	4173,	the	language	in	the	derivative	
portion	of	the	bill	was	debated	heatedly,	and	a	final	amendment	to	H.R.	
4173	to	return	the	language	in	the	derivatives	bill	to	the	original	House	
version	was	voted	down.62	At	the	forefront	of	the	debate	was	the	level	
of	regulation	over	end-users.	Both	the	Senate	and	the	House	bill	had	a	
type	of	end-user	exception;	however,	the	clearly	delineated	exemption	
for	end-users	did	not	make	it	into	the	final	bill.	Instead,	the	definition	
of	“major	swap	participant”	attempted	to	strike	a	balance	when	end-
users	may	fall	within	the	definition	and	thus	would	have	to	register	as	
“major	swap	participants.”63	The	final	bill	included	an	exemption	from
59	 155	Cong. Rec. H14,712	(daily	ed.	Dec.	10,	2010)	(In	opposition	to	Rep.	Murphy’s	amendment,	
Rep.	Frank:	“The	bill	that	is	in	there	now,	and	it	differs	from	the	Agriculture	bill,	says	if	the	end	
user	is	causing	financial	losses	and	problems	at	a	particular	counterparty,	then	you	should	not	
have	the	exemption.	The	alternative	is	to	say	no,	let’s	not	step	in	if	this	or	that	or	many	counter-	
parties	are	in	problems	until	it	could	become	a	systemic	risk.	We	don’t	want	to	wait	for	systemic	
risk.	I	don’t	want	to	wait	until	people	are	at	the	edge	of	the	cliff	to	start	to	pull	them	back.”).	
60	 H.R. Rep. No.	111–370,	at	11	(2009).
61	 See supra notes	62-66.	
62	 See	156	Cong. Rec. H5,227	(daily	ed.	June	30,	2010)	(statement	of	Rep.	Garrett)	(“Unfortunately,	
not	a	single	Democrat	supported	that	House	language	in	the	final	vote,	despite	the	fact	that	very	
same	language	was	originally	sponsored	by	the	.	.	.	chairman.”).
63	 See	155	Cong. Rec. H14,713	(daily	ed.	Dec.	10,	2009)	(statement	of	Rep.	Frank)	(“I	support	an	
end	user	exemption.	But	when	an	end	user	is	employing	that	exemption	in	a	way	that	puts	coun-
terparties	at	risk,	I	don’t	want	to	have	to	wait	until	a	cataclysm	impends.	I	would	like	there	to	be	
the	ability	to	step	in	and	stop	it	at	that	point.”).
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clearing	for	counterparties	that	meant	the	clearing	exemption	require-
ments.64	While	regulators	would	be	able	to	impose	margin	requirements	
on	swap	dealers	and	major	swap	participants,	these	requirements	are	
not	meant	to	be	imposed	on	end-users,	unless	the	end-user	falls	into	
the	definition	of	a	major	swap	participant.65	This	was	little	consolation	
to	 those	 in	Congress	who	would	have	preferred	an	absolute	exemp-
tion	 for	 end-users.	 Multiple	 amendments	 were	 proposed	 to	 solidify	
an	exemption	for	end-users;	however,	all	 the	amendments	were	sub-
sequently	voted	down	in	the	Conference	Committee.	While	the	intent	
of	Congress	is	that	end-users	should	not	be	subjected	to	burdensome	
margin	requirements,66	the	current	exemption	from	clearing	is	vague,67	
and	there	could	be	a	potential	for	further	problems.
Part III
Even	 before	 the	 legislation	 was	 complete,	 the	 CDS	 market	 had	
already	begun	the	standardization	and	clearing	process.68	The	inevita-
ble	question	that	remains,	however,	is	what	standardization	and	clear-
ing	will	do	for	the	market.	Integral	to	this	question	is	figuring	out	the	
problem	we	are	trying	to	solve.	Some	of	the	important	benefits	of	CDSs	
are	the	liquidity	they	produce	in	the	market,	the	increased	opportuni-
ties	for	hedging,	and	a	more	efficient	market	for	trading	credit	risk.69	By	
being	able	to	hedge	against	the	loans	a	bank	offers,	those	banks	decrease	
their	risk	of	being	adversely	affected	if	companies	later	default	on	those	
loans.70	Additionally,	because	these	banks	can	lend	at	lower	risk,	there	
is	increased	liquidity	in	the	banking	industry,	analogous	to	the	result	of	
64	 Dodd-Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	and	Consumer	Protection	Act,	H.R.	4173,	111th	Cong.	§	723	(7)
(1)(A)	(“Clearing	requirements	shall	not	apply	to	a	swap	if	1	of	the	counterparties	to	the	swap	—	
(i)	is	not	a	financial	entity;	(ii)	is	using	swaps	to	hedge	or	mitigate	commercial	risk;	and	(iii)	notifies	
the	Commission,	in	a	manner	set	forth	by	the	Commission,	how	it	generally	meets	its	financial	
obligations	associated	with	entering	into	non-cleared	swaps.”).
65	 156	Cong. Rec. H5,248	(daily	ed.	June	30,	2010)	(statement	of	Rep.	Peterson)	(emphasizing	that	
regulators	have	been	given	no	authority	to	impose	margin	requirements	on	anyone	other	than	
swap	dealers	or	major	swap	participants	and	that	few	end	users	would	fall	under	the	“major	swap	
participant”	definition	because	“positions	held	 for	hedging	or	mitigating	commercial	 risk”	are	
excluded	from	being	considered	as	a	“substantial	position.”).
66	 See 156	Cong. Rec.	H5,248	(daily	ed.	June	30,	2010)	(statement	of	Rep.	Frank)	(stating	that	mar-
ginal	requirements	are	not	required	for	end-users).
67	 H.R.	4173,	111th	Cong.	§	723(h)(7)	(2010)	(stating	that	swaps	are	not	required	to	be	cleared	if	
one	party	to	the	transaction	is	not	a	financial	entity	and	is	using	swaps	to	hedge	or	mitigate	com-
mercial	risk).	
68	 See	Enigma of Clearing,	supra	note	32,	at	6	 (explaining	 that	 there	has	already	been	success	 in	
clearing	credit	default	swaps).	
69	 Partnoy	&	Skeel,	supra	note	16,	at	1022	(discussing	the	benefits	of	credit	derivatives).
70	 Id.	at	1024	(“Alan	Greenspan	and	others	have	argued	that	credit	derivatives	served	as	a	shock	
absorber	during	the	corporate	crises	of	2001	and	2002.	Because	many	of	the	lenders	to	companies	
like	Enron	and	WorldCom	had	hedged	their	risk,	 the	corporate	scandals	did	not	spread	to	the	
banking	industry.”).	
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securitization	on	home	mortgage	lending.71	With	that	increased	liquid-
ity,	there	is	also	increased	information.	The	prices	of	the	CDSs	provide	
another	source	of	information	about	a	company’s	financial	health.72
A. The Problems in The mArkeT And The PoTenTiAl soluTions
However,	 the	market	 is	not	without	 serious	problems.	The	prob-
lems	include	systemic	risk,	limited	disclosures,	and	incentives	against	
monitoring.	 Due	 to	 the	 opacity	 of	 the	 credit	 default	 market	 and	 the	
limited	disclosures,	 it	 is	unclear	what	the	contractual	agreements	are	
and	who	actually	holds	what	positions.73	This	issue	further	exacerbated	
the	 systemic	 risk	 concerns	 of	 counterparties	 performing	 on	 the	 con-
tracts	and	the	operational	risk	of	proper	settlement.74	Since	collateral	
and	margin	requirements	are	decided	in	each	contract	independently	
of	any	other	contract,	there	is	little	understanding	of	the	true	counter-
party	risk	and	the	inability	to	ascertain	whether	adequate	collateral	has	
been	posted.75
Inherent	in	the	CDS	market	is	the	issue	of	monitoring	incentives.76	
In	their	traditional	roles,	banks	reserved	the	option	to	step	in	and	assist	
debtors	before	bankruptcy	occurred.77	Thus,	banks	had	a	role	 in	cor-
porate	governance	due	to	their	investment	in	the	company.	CDS	con-
tracts,	however,	incentivize	banks	to	hedge	against	their	lending	risk	
instead	of	beefing	up	corporate	governance.78	These	four	interrelated	
issues	(monitoring	disincentives,	systemic	risk,	manipulation/mispric-
71	 Id.	at	1025	(“Because	swaps	limit	the	bank’s	downside	risk	(and	pass	it	on	to	other	parties,	such	
as	insurance	companies	and	pension	funds),	bank	are	willing	to	lend	much	more	money	to	many	
more	businesses.	Credit	default	swaps	thus	significantly	expand	companies’	access	to	capital	from	
bank	lending.”).
72	 See id.	at	1026	(stating	that	while	CDS	contracts	are	another	source	of	market-based	information,	
that	information	also	needs	to	be	disclosed	or	available	to	the	market).	
73	 Id.	at	1036.	
74	 See	 Viral	 V.	 Acharya,	 Robert	 F.	 Engle,	 Stephen	 Figlewski,	 Anthony	 W.	 Lynch	 &	 Marti	 G.	
Subrahmanyam, Centralized Clearing for Credit Derivatives,	 in Restoring Financial Stability: 
How to Repair a Failed System	251,	252	(Viral	V.	Acharya	&	Matthew	Richardson	eds.,	2009)	
(“Each	party	in	an	OTC	contract	bears	the	risk	that	the	counterparty	will	fail	to	fulfill	its	obligation	
in	the	futures.	Operational	risk	creates	uncertainty	about	whether	OTC	trades	will	be	cleared	and	
settled	in	an	orderly	manner.”).	
75	 Id.	
76	 René	 M.	 Stulz,	 Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis	 7	 (European	 Corporate	 Governance	
Inst.,	 Working	 Paper	 No.	 264,	 2009),	 available at http://www.ecgi.org/wp/wp_id.php?id=400	
(“The	separation	of	risk-bearing	and	funding	made	possible	by	credit	derivatives	has	the	poten-
tial	to	create	problems	in	that	lenders	who	fund	companies	but	do	not	bear	their	risks	have	less	
incentive	to	monitor	their	loans.”).
77	 Partnoy	&	Skeel,	supra	note	16,	at	1022	(“In	the	standard	account	of	banks’	role	in	corporate	
governance,	particularly	as	the	borrower’s	fortunes	deteriorate,	banks	are	the	muscular	superhe-
roes	who	step	in	and	take	charge	to	right	the	troubled	ship.”).
78	 Id.	at	1033	(“The	banks	that	financed	Enron	had	used	massive	amounts	of	credit	derivatives	
to	limit	their	exposure	in	the	event	Enron	defaulted	—	by	one	estimate,	they	used	more	than	800	
swaps	to	law	of	$8	billion	of	Enron	risk.	.	.	.	[T]he	prospect	of	Enron’s	decline	meant	must	less	to	
Enron’s	banks	than	if	their	loans	were	fully	exposed.”).	
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ing,	and	limited	disclosures)	reflect	the	overlying	problems	within	the	
CDS	 markets.	 Specifically,	 regulators	 have	 honed	 in	 on	 the	 counter-
party	and	operation	risk	and	the	lack	of	transparency	for	allowing	sys-
temic	risk	exposures	to	grow	without	being	noticed.
B. Will the ProPosed legislation solve these ProBlems?
Integral	 to	 the	 proposed	 legislation	 is	 shifting	 over-the-counter	
derivatives	to	clearinghouses.79	As	with	any	policy	decision,	there	are	
advantages	and	disadvantages.	Clearinghouses	are	beneficial	because	
the	 clearinghouse	 achieves	 both	 risk-reduction	 and	 risk-spreading.80	
The	 clearinghouse	 achieves	 a	 degree	 of	 risk-spreading	 by	 interpos-
ing	 itself	 between	 all	 the	 clearing	 members	 and	 becoming	 the	 coun-
terparty	 to	 every	 transaction.81	 The	 clearinghouse	 sets	 the	 collateral	
requirements	to	daily	reflect	the	contracts	assumed	by	the	traders	and	
the	changes	in	value	of	the	position,	which	is	referred	to	as	“mark-to-
market.”	 Moreover,	 the	 clearinghouse	 is	 able	 to	 reduce	 risk	 through	
“netting”	 contracts.82	 Netting	 is	 a	 strategy	 that	 offsets	 matching	 and	
opposing	trades	to	minimize	the	risks	associated	with	settlement.83
Nonetheless,	before	 a	derivatives	 contract	 is	 eligible	 for	 clearing,	
the	contract	must	be	adequately	standardized	to	allow	for	easy	trading	
and	netting.	While	various	articles	have	made	arguments	against	the	
standardization	of	over-the-counter	derivatives,84	CDSs	have	already	
begun	the	transition	to	clearinghouses.85	To	reiterate,	H.R.	4173	would	
put	 over-the-counter	 derivatives	 on	 clearinghouses	 if	 the	 clearing-
houses	accept	those	derivatives,	and	the	CFTC/SEC	states	that	those	
derivatives	need	 to	be	cleared.86	While	 the	end-user	exemption	 from	
79	 See Enigma of Clearing,	supra	note	32,	at	4	(“The	recently	passed	House	Bill	and	the	proposed	
Senate	Finance	Committee	bill	each	impose	clearing	requirements	on	OTC	derivatives.”).	
80	 Richard	Dale,	Risk Management in U.S. Derivatives Clearing Houses,	14	Essays in International 
Financial & Economic Law 8 (1998). 
81	 Id.
82	 Alex	Blumberg,	Unregulated Credit Default Swaps Led to Weakness,	NPR	(Oct.	31,	2008),	http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=	96395271.	
83	 Sharon	Brown-Hruska,	The Derivatives Marketplace: Exchanges and the Over-the-Counter Market,	
Financial Derivatives 31 (Robert	W.	Kolb	&	James	A.	Overdahl	eds.,	2010).
84	 See, e.g.,	 Jonathan	 D.	 Gupta,	 Modernizing the Infrastructure for OTC Derivatives: CDS Central 
Counterparties and Other Industry Initiatives to Address Systemic, Counterparty and Operational Risks 
in Derivatives Trades,	29	Futures & Derivatives L. Rep. 11,	14	(Mar.	2009)	(“[R]egulators	have	also	
emphasized	the	 importance	of	customized	[over-the-counter]	 transactions	to	the	efficient	func-
tioning	of	financial	markets.”).	
85	 Press	Release,	IntercontinentalExchange,	Inc.,	ICE	Trust	Marks	One-Year	Anniversary	for	North	
American	CDS	Clearing;	Expanded	Set	of	Initiatives	in	First	Half	2010;	$6.4	Trillion	Cleared	by	ICE	
on	 a	 Global	 Basis	 (Mar.	 9,	 2010),	 available at http://ir.theice.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=	
450426.
86	 See	discussion	supra	Part	II.	
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clearing	was	highly	debated,	the	intent	of	Congress	was	for	end-users	
to	be	mostly	free	from	margin	requirements.	87
However,	clearing	may	not	necessarily	be	the	solution	to	the	entire	
over-the-counter	 derivatives	 problem.	 While	 a	 substantial	 amount	
of	 CDS	 contracts	 have	 been	 standardized	 and	 cleared,	 there	 is	 an	
increased	cost	associated	with	clearing.88	The	market	participants	most	
harmed	by	the	lack	of	tailored	contracts	are,	allegedly,	the	buy	side	or	
end-users.	These	market	participants	tend	to	have	an	underlying	con-
nection	 to	 the	asset	 they	are	 trying	 to	hedge	and,	 thus,	 seek	 tailored	
contracts	to	hedge	against	their	specific	risk.89	In	addition,	while	trad-
ing	derivatives	using	clearinghouse	procedures	is	less	risky,	there	also	
may	be	limited	utility	due	to	small	market	share	for	some	contracts.90
However,	arguments	against	standardization	do	not	minimize	the	
benefits	of	clearing.	The	new	financial	legislation	balances	the	ability	of	
end-users	to	opt-out	of	clearing	requirements	while	creating	a	threshold	
where	end-users	would	no	longer	be	eligible	for	those	exemptions.	In	
addition,	clearing	includes	safety	precautions,	such	as	ensuring	market	
participants	are	aware	of	their	losses	and	gains	daily.91	The	disadvan-
tage	of	a	clearinghouse	is	that	the	clearinghouse	is	solely	responsible	
for	maintaining	near-zero	counterparty	risk	and,	thus,	may	be	suscep-
tible	to	“too	big	to	fail”	concerns.92
87	 See 156	Cong. Rec.	H5,248	(daily	ed.	June	30,	2010)	(statement	of	Rep.	Frank)	(stating	that	mar-
ginal	requirements	are	not	required	for	end-users).
88	 See Acharya,	supra	note	74,	at	262–63	(“A	bigger	issue	is	resistance	from	large	players	to	move	
trading	from	OTC	markets	to	centralized	exchanges,	because	they	benefit	from	lack	of	transpar-
ency	of	OTC	markets	and	would	likely	be	required	to	post	higher	collateral	to	clearinghouses	and	
exchanges.”).	
89	 See	Enigma of Clearing,	supra	note	32,	at	5	(“The	buy	side	has	specific	and	customized	needs	for	
its	use	of	OTC	derivatives	and	would	resist	using	‘cleared’	OTC	derivatives	that	cannot	be	highly	
customized	or	derivatives	that	have	become	too	expensive	or	cumbersome	due	to	increased	mar-
gining	requirements	or	regulation.”).
90	 See	Gupta,	supra	note	84,	at	14	(“[T]he	CFTC	has	observed	that	certain	listed	credit	derivative	
products	in	the	past	have	been	unable	to	gain	significant	market	share,	observing	that	‘the	utility	
of	some	customized	off-exchange	instruments	might	be	lost	if	they	become	sufficiently	standard-
ized	.	.	.	.”).	
91	 See	 id.	 (“[T]hese	 critical	 risk	management	 functions	prevent	 small	 losses	 from	accumulating	
unnoticed.”).	
92	 See	Mark	J.	Roe,	Opinion,	Derivatives Clearinghouses Are No Magic Bullet,	Wall. St. J.,	May	6,	
2010,	available at http://online.wsj.com/article/	SB1000142405274870387190457521625191538314
6.html	(“[S]ince	a	clearing-house	is	itself	at	risk	of	being	too	big	to	fail,	regulators	need	to	police	its	
capital	and	collateral	requirements.	If	the	derivatives	market	sees	the	clearinghouse	as	too	big	to	
fail,	the	potential	for	derivatives	players	making	overly	risky	derivatives	trades	becomes	real.”).	
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Part IV
a. GoVernance
There	 are	 multiple	 benefits	 to	 the	 clearing	 system;	 however,	 the	
question	that	still	lingers	is	whether	clearing	CDS	contracts	will	solve	
the	problems	that	plagued	corporations	like	AIG.93	Implicit	in	the	gov-
ernment	 regulation	 is	 that	 clearing	 will	 prevent	 the	 occurrence	 of	 a	
“market	failure”	and	financial	crisis.	However,	while	clearing	will	cre-
ate	more	transparency,	there	is	also	a	limit	to	how	helpful	clearing	will	
be.94	The	issues	of	bad	corporate	governance	still	underlie	the	trading	
choices	many	companies	adopted.95	Nevertheless,	without	a	stronger	
duty	of	care,	 there	remains	 little	more	that	can	be	required	of	corpo-
rations.96	Through	the	financial	crisis,	there	have	been	calls	for	greater	
shareholder	involvement;	however,	that	involvement	is	only	equal	to	
the	incentives	of	the	shareholders.97	Shareholder	incentives	tend	to	be	
limited	only	to	the	success	of	their	investment.
Clearing	CDSs	is	far	from	a	novel	concept,	and	the	general	consen-
sus	is	that	by	clearing	the	CDS	contracts,	there	will	be	greater	transpar-
ency	within	the	CDS	market	and	less	risk.	It	also	may	be	the	only	option	
left.	While	the	abuse	of	CDSs	has	exposed	Wall	Street’s	herd	mentality	
towards	 complicated	 and	 sometimes	 indecipherable	 financial	 instru-
ments,	greater	transparency	may	be	the	only	real	check	on	Wall	Street.98	
Moreover,	it	is	still	unclear	how	CDSs	will	ultimately	impact	the	moni-
toring	incentives	of	banks	towards	their	customers.99	The	transparency	
of	the	CDS	markets	could	drastically	change	the	way	customers	view	
93	 See generally id. (questioning	whether	clearing	CDS	contracts	will	make	the	system	more	risk	
adverse). 
94	 See	Houman	B.	Shadab,	Counterparty Regulation and Its Limits: The Evolution of the Credit Default 
Swaps Market,	54	N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev.	689,	704	(2009)	(“Despite	the	rapid	growth	and	proliferation	
of	CDSs	during	 the	post-turn-of-the-century	credit	boom	and	 the	subprime-mortgage-initiated	
financial	crisis,	 the	risk	management	practices	of	CDS	counterparties	were	generally	adequate,	
and	the	broader	infrastructure	of	the	CDS	market	remained	generally	stable.”).	
95	 See, e.g.,	Madden,	supra	note	8,	at	16	(recalling	that	AIG	took	a	large	position	in	credit	default	
swaps	without	a	hedge).	
96	 See generally	Paul	Ali,	Corporate Governance and Derivatives End Users,	in	Practical Derivatives: 
A Transactional Approach 9,	11	(Jonathan	Denton	ed.,	2006)	(outlining	the	duty	of	care	expect-
ed	from	corporate	governance).
97	 See generally	Calcina	Howson,	When “Good” Corporate Governance Makes “Bad” (Financial) Firms: 
The Global Crisis and the Limits of Private Law,	108	Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions	44,	48	(“In	a	
word,	most	financial	firm	shareholders	are	interested	in	the	current	profits	of	the	firm	in	which	
they	invest,	with	little	regard	for	the	long-term	health	of	the	firm	itself,	and	no	identifiable	interest	
whatsoever	in	the	entire	financial	system	.	.	.	.”).	
98	 See	Felix	Salmon,	A Formula for Disaster,	Wired,	Mar.	2009,	at	74	(explaining	the	simple	formula	
for	credit	ratings,	based	on	real-world	data	from	credit	default	swaps;	unfortunately,	the	formula	
was	followed	without	question	and	the	formula	was	also	severely	flawed	and	produced	inaccu-
rate	results).
99	 See	Howson,	supra	note	97,	at	49	(discussing	the	fees	Wall	Street	bankers	received	from	these	
transactions	and	the	lack	of	monitoring).	
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the	vote	of	confidence	from	a	bank	lending	to	their	company;	however,	
the	possibility	always	remains	that	the	customers	could	simply	take	the	
money	and	enjoy	the	lack	of	monitoring.
B. The Clearing of CDSS iS an imperfeCT SoluTion.
While	 the	 clearing	of	CDSs	will	 add	 transparency	 to	 the	market,	
there	are	still	lingering	questions	regarding	whether	the	proposed	leg-
islation	 may	 create	 problems	 and	 potential	 loopholes.	 The	 ongoing	
debate	over	 the	exemption	 for	end-users	 is	particularly	noticeable.100	
The	benefit	 for	 this	exemption	 is	 that	companies	or	 individuals	who	
have	exposure	to	the	direct	asset	can	tailor	their	particular	CDS	con-
tracts	 to	 the	 asset’s	 risk.101	 However,	 there	 is	 also	 the	 fear	 that	 this	
exemption	 will	 become	 a	 loophole	 within	 the	 legislation102	 or,	 in	 the	
alternative,	it	will	unnecessarily	restrict	market	actors.	While	this	issue	
will	 only	 be	 resolved	 in	 subsequent	 regulations	 from	 the	 CFTC	 and	
SEC,	it	is	an	issue	worth	watching.
ConCluSion
While	the	market	is	still	recovering	from	the	financial	crisis	of	2008,	
the	clearing	of	CDSs	is	a	policy	that	has	potential	to	be	very	beneficial.	
For	 CDS	 contracts,	 the	 market	 is	 already	 strongly	 standardized	 and	
moving	the	contracts	through	clearinghouses	will	add	to	the	transpar-
ency	 and	 security	 of	 the	 market.	 Through	 clearinghouses,	 the	 CFTC	
and	 the	SEC	can	 regulate	 the	contracts	 to	prevent	manipulation	and	
fraud.	In	addition,	pricing	mechanisms	will	become	more	accurate	due	
to	the	transparency	of	data	relating	to	the	actual	contracts.	While	the	
benefits	are	yet	to	be	seen,	there	are	also	potential	disadvantages.	The	
CFTC	 took	 a	 strong	 stance	 against	 a	 large	 end-user	 exemption.	 The	
exemption	may	turn	out	to	be	a	large	loophole	in	the	legislation,	or	it	
has	the	potential	to	allow	end-users	to	use	CDSs	for	their	customized	
needs.
Regardless,	the	drastic	change	to	the	over-the-counter	derivatives	
market	 cannot	 be	 understated.	 While	 this	 paper	 focused	 on	 CDSs,	
many	over-the-counter	derivatives	are	not	as	easily	standardized,	and	
the	job	left	to	the	CFTC	and	SEC	to	regulate	and	consider	these	deriva-
100	H.R.	4173	§	721.
101	See Rena S. Miller,	 Cong. Research Serv., R40965, Key Issues in Derivatives Reform, 6	
(2009)	(“Thus,	nearly	two-thirds	of	OTC	derivatives	involve	an	end	user.	If	all	end	users	are	ex-
empted	from	the	requirement	that	OTC	swaps	be	cleared,	the	market	structure	problems	raised	
by	AIG	still	remain.”).
102	Gary	 Gensler,	 Chairman,	 Commodity	 Futures	 Trading	 Comm.,	 OTC	 Derivatives	 Reform,	
Atlantic Council	(Jan.	12,	2010)	(asserting	that	the	Wall	Street	banks	benefit	from	the	end-user	
exemption	rather	than	the	businesses	using	the	derivatives).
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tives	will	be	immense.	The	benefits,	however,	cannot	be	understated.	
Regulators	and	the	public	cannot	take	for	granted	a	more	transparent	
and	a	potentially	less	risky	financial	system.
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